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Reportability and illusions of phenomenality in the light of the global neuronal workspace model

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Lionel Naccache  and
Stanislas Dehaene
Lionel Naccache
Affiliation:
Fédération de Neurophysiologie Clinique, Fédération de Neurologie, Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière, Paris, France INSERM Cognitive Neuro-Imaging Unit, CEA/SAC/DSV/DRM Neurospin Center, Gif/Yvette Cedex, France. [email protected]@cea.fr
Stanislas Dehaene
Affiliation:
INSERM Cognitive Neuro-Imaging Unit, CEA/SAC/DSV/DRM Neurospin Center, Gif/Yvette Cedex, France. [email protected]@cea.fr
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Abstract

Can we ever experimentally disentangle phenomenal consciousness from the cognitive accessibility inherent to conscious reports? In this commentary, we suggest that (1) Block's notion of phenomenal consciousness remains intractably entangled with the need to obtain subjective reports about it; and (2) many experimental paradigms suggest that the intuitive notion of a rich but non-reportable phenomenal world is, to a large extent illusory – in a sense that requires clarification.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 518 - 520
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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