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Reductionism and the neuron doctrine: A metaphysical fix of Gold & Stoljar's trivial–radical distinction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

James Fahey  and
Michael Zenzen
James Fahey
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Psychology and Cognitive Science, Rensselaer Polytechnical Institute (RPI), Troy, NY 12180-3590 {faheyj2;zenzen}@rpi.edu
Michael Zenzen
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Psychology and Cognitive Science, Rensselaer Polytechnical Institute (RPI), Troy, NY 12180-3590 {faheyj2;zenzen}@rpi.edu
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Abstract

The trivial neuron doctrine (TND) holds that psychology merely depends on neurobiology. The radical neuron doctrine (RND) goes further and claims that psychology is superfluous in that neuroscience can “replace it.” Popular among RND notions of “replacement” is “reduction,” and in our commentary we challenge Gold & Stoljar (G&S) to make clear their distinction between merely depends on (TND) and is reducible to (RND). G&S give us a TND–RND distinction that is a distinction without a difference; a defensible TND–RND distinction must have a metaphysical basis. We suggest a denial of compositionalism as such a basis.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 5 , October 1999 , pp. 835 - 836
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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