Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-vdxz6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-27T18:54:05.562Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Reading Semantic Cognition as a theory of concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 December 2008

Jesse Snedeker
Jesse Snedeker
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138. [email protected]://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~lds/index.html?snedeker.html
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Any theory of semantic cognition is also a theory of concepts. There are two ways to construe the models presented by Rogers & McClelland (R&M) in Semantic Cognition. If we construe the input and output representations as concepts, then the models capture knowledge acquisition within a stable set of concepts. If we construe the hidden-layer representations as concepts, the models provide a simulation of conceptual change.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 31 , Issue 6 , December 2008 , pp. 727 - 728
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Fodor, J. (1998) Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laurence, S. & Margolis, E. (1999) Concepts and cognitive science. In: Concepts: Core readings, ed. Margolis, E. & Laurence, S., pp. 3–81. Bradford Books/MIT Press.Google Scholar
Rogers, T. T. & McClelland, J. L. (2004) Semantic cognition: A parallel distributed processing approach. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar