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Probabilistic equilibria for evolutionarily stable strategies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2007

Roger A. McCain
Roger A. McCain
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and International Business, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA 19104. [email protected]://william-king.www.drexel.edu/
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Abstract

This commentary suggests that an equilibrium framework may be retained, in an evolutionary model such as Gintis's and with more satisfactory results, if rationality is relaxed in a slightly different way than he proposes: that is, if decisions are assumed to be related to rewards probabilistically, rather than with certainty. This relaxed concept of rationality gives rise to probabilistic equilibria.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 1 , February 2007 , pp. 34 - 36
Copyright
2007 Cambridge University Press

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