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Ordinary people do not ignore base rates

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

Donald Laming
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge, Department of Experimental Psychology, Downing Street, Cambridge, CB2 3EB, United Kingdom. [email protected]

Abstract

Human responses to probabilities can be studied through gambling and through experiments presenting biased sequences of stimuli. In both cases, participants are sensitive to base rates. They adjust automatically to changes in base rate; such adjustment is incompatible with conformity to Bayes' Theorem. ”Base-rate neglect” is therefore specific to the exercises in mental arithmetic reviewed in the target article.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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