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One wrong does not justify another: Accepting dual processes by fallacy of false alternatives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

Gideon Keren ,
Iris van Rooij  and
Yaacov Schul
Gideon Keren
Affiliation:
Department of Technology Management, Eindhoven University of Technology, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The [email protected]@tue.nl
Iris van Rooij
Affiliation:
Department of Technology Management, Eindhoven University of Technology, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The [email protected]@tue.nl
Yaacov Schul
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel. [email protected]
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Abstract

Barbey & Sloman (B&S) advocate a dual-process (two-system) approach by comparing it with an alternative perspective (ecological rationality), claiming that the latter is unwarranted. Rejecting this alternative approach cannot serve as sufficient evidence for the viability of the former.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , June 2007 , pp. 269 - 270
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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