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On widening the explanatory gap

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

A. H. C. van der Heijden ,
P. T. W. Hudson  and
A. G. Kurvink
A. H. C. van der Heijden
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental and Theoretical Psychology, Leiden University, 2300 RB Leiden, The [email protected]@rulfsw.leidenuniv.nl www.rulfsw.leidenuniv.nl
P. T. W. Hudson
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental and Theoretical Psychology, Leiden University, 2300 RB Leiden, The [email protected]@rulfsw.leidenuniv.nl www.rulfsw.leidenuniv.nl
A. G. Kurvink
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental and Theoretical Psychology, Leiden University, 2300 RB Leiden, The [email protected]@rulfsw.leidenuniv.nl www.rulfsw.leidenuniv.nl
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Abstract

The explanatory gap refers to the lack of concepts for understanding “how it is that . . . a state of consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue.” By assuming that there are colours in the outside world, Block needlessly widens this gap and Lycan and Kitcher simply fail to see the gap. When such assumptions are abandoned, an unnecessary and incomprehensible constraint disappears. It then becomes clear that the brain can use its own neural language for representing aspects of the outside world. While this may not close the gap, it becomes clearer where we need new concepts.

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 157 - 158
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

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