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On the design and function of rational arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2011

John E. Opfer  and
Vladimir Sloutsky
John E. Opfer
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210. [email protected]://faculty.psy.ohio-state.edu/opfer/opfer/[email protected]://cogdev.cog.ohio-state.edu
Vladimir Sloutsky
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210. [email protected]://faculty.psy.ohio-state.edu/opfer/opfer/[email protected]://cogdev.cog.ohio-state.edu
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Abstract

It is unclear how an argumentative environment would select for better reasoning given three general findings. First, argument rationality typically fails to persuade poor reasoners. Second, reasoned argumentation competes with more persuasive and less rational arguments for limited cognitive resources. Third, those poor at reasoning fail to distinguish between valid and invalid arguments. Reasoning, therefore, is poorly designed for argument.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , April 2011 , pp. 85 - 86
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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