Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-01T02:54:28.122Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

on moral intuitions and moral heuristics: a response

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2005

cass r. sunstein
Affiliation:
university of chicago, law school and department of political science, chicago, il 60637 [email protected] http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/sunstein/

Abstract

moral heuristics are pervasive, and they produce moral errors. we can identify those errors as such even if we do not endorse any contentious moral view. to accept this point, it is also unnecessary to make controversial claims about moral truth. but the notion of moral heuristics can be understood in diverse ways, and a great deal of work remains to be done in understanding the nature of moral intuitions, especially those that operate automatically and nonreflectively, and in exploring the possibility of altering such intuitions through modest changes in context and narrative.

Type
author's response
Copyright
2005 cambridge university press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)