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Norms and high-level cognition: Consequences, trends, and antidotes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Simon McNair
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, Queen's University Belfast, University Road, Belfast BT7 1NN, United Kingdom. [email protected]@qub.ac.ukhttp://www.psych.qub.ac.uk/Staff/Profiles/feeney/index.aspx
Aidan Feeney
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, Queen's University Belfast, University Road, Belfast BT7 1NN, United Kingdom. [email protected]@qub.ac.ukhttp://www.psych.qub.ac.uk/Staff/Profiles/feeney/index.aspx

Abstract

We are neither as pessimistic nor as optimistic as Elqayam & Evans (E&E). The consequences of normativism have not been uniformly disastrous, even among the examples they consider. However, normativism won't be going away any time soon and in the literature on causal Bayes nets new debates about normativism are emerging. Finally, we suggest that to concentrate on expert reasoners as an antidote to normativism may limit the contribution of research on thinking to basic psychological science.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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