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Normative benchmarks are useful for studying individual differences in reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Edward J. N. Stupple  and
Linden J. Ball
Edward J. N. Stupple
Affiliation:
Centre for Psychological Research, University of Derby, Kedleston Road, Derby, DE22 1GB, United Kingdom. [email protected]://psychology.derby.ac.uk/staff/Ed_Stupple.html
Linden J. Ball
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YF, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.psych.lancs.ac.uk/people/LindenBall.html
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Abstract

We applaud many aspects of Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) call for a descriptivist research programme in studying reasoning. Nevertheless, we contend that normative benchmarks are vital for understanding individual differences in performance. We argue that the presence of normative responses to particular problems by certain individuals should inspire researchers to look for converging evidence for analytic processing that may have a normative basis.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 2011 , pp. 270 - 271
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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