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Non-interpretative metacognition for true beliefs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Ori Friedman  and
Adam R. Petrashek
Ori Friedman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1, Canada. [email protected]://www.psychology.uwaterloo.ca/people/faculty/friedman/[email protected]
Adam R. Petrashek
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1, Canada. [email protected]://www.psychology.uwaterloo.ca/people/faculty/friedman/[email protected]
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Abstract

Mindreading often requires access to beliefs, so the mindreading system should be able to self-attribute beliefs, even without self-interpretation. This proposal is consistent with Carruthers' claim that mindreading and metacognition depend on the same cognitive system and the same information as one another; and it may be more consistent with this claim than is Carruthers' account of metacognition.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 146 - 147
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

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