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Neither moralists, nor scientists: We are counterfactually reasoning animals
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 October 2010
Abstract
We are neither scientists nor moralists. Our mental capacities (such as attributing intentionality) are neither akin to the scientist's exact reasoning, nor are they “suffused through and through with moral considerations” (Knobe's target article, sect. 2.2, last para.). They are more similar to all those simple capacities that humans and animals are equally capable of, but with enhanced sensitivity to counterfactual situations: of what could have been.
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