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More than control freaks: Evaluative and motivational functions of goals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2008

Fabio Paglieri  and
Cristiano Castelfranchi
Fabio Paglieri
Affiliation:
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 00185 Rome, Italy. [email protected]://www.media.unisi.it/cirg/fp/[email protected]://www.istc.cnr.it/createhtml.php?nbr=62
Cristiano Castelfranchi
Affiliation:
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 00185 Rome, Italy. [email protected]://www.media.unisi.it/cirg/fp/[email protected]://www.istc.cnr.it/createhtml.php?nbr=62
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Abstract

True to its sensorimotor inspiration, Hurley's shared circuits model (SCM) describes goal-states only within a homeostatic mechanism for action control, neglecting to consider other functions of goals – namely, evaluation and motivation. This restriction thwarts Hurley's project of identifying the information resources enabling social cognition. In order to master intentional behavior, deliberation, and action understanding, we need to be more than just “control freaks.”

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , February 2008 , pp. 35 - 36
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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