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Metacognition without introspection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Peter Langland-Hassan
Peter Langland-Hassan
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The Graduate Center of the City University of New York, New York, NY 10016. [email protected]://wfs.gc.cuny.edu/PLangland-Hassan
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Abstract

While Carruthers denies that humans have introspective access to cognitive attitudes such as belief, he allows introspective access to perceptual and quasi-perceptual mental states. Yet, despite his own reservations, the basic architecture he describes for third-person mindreading can accommodate first-person mindreading without need to posit a distinct “introspective” mode of access to any of one's own mental states.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 151 - 152
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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