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Language, consciousness, and cross-modular thought

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 August 2003

Keith Frankish
Keith Frankish
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, [email protected] http://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/philos/frankish.htm
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Abstract

Carruthers suggests that natural language, in the form of inner speech, may be the vehicle of conscious propositional thought, but he argues that its fundamental cognitive role is as the medium of cross-modular thinking, both conscious and nonconscious. I argue that there is no evidence for nonconscious cross-modular thinking and that the most plausible view is that cross-modular thinking, like conscious propositional thinking, occurs only in inner speech.

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 25 , Issue 6 , December 2002 , pp. 685 - 686
Copyright
© 2002 Cambridge University Press

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