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Knowledge by ignoring

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Paul M. Pietroski  and
Susan J. Dwyer
Paul M. Pietroski
Affiliation:
Linguistics and Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7615 [email protected]
Susan J. Dwyer
Affiliation:
Linguistics and Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7615 [email protected]
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Abstract

Some cases of implicit knowledge involve representations of (implicitly) known propositions, but this is not the only important type of implicit knowledge. Chomskian linguistics suggests another model of how humans can know more than is accessible to consciousness. Innate capacities to focus on a small range of possibilities, thereby ignoring many others, need not be grounded by inner representations of any possibilities ignored. This model may apply to many domains where human cognition “fills a gap” between stimuli and judgment.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 5 , October 1999 , pp. 781
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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