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Is everyone Bayes? On the testable implications of Bayesian Fundamentalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 August 2011

Maarten Speekenbrink  and
David R. Shanks
Maarten Speekenbrink
Affiliation:
Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.psychol.ucl.ac.uk/[email protected]://www.psychol.ucl.ac.uk/david.shanks/Shanks.html
David R. Shanks
Affiliation:
Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.psychol.ucl.ac.uk/[email protected]://www.psychol.ucl.ac.uk/david.shanks/Shanks.html
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Abstract

A central claim of Jones & Love's (J&L's) article is that Bayesian Fundamentalism is empirically unconstrained. Unless constraints are placed on prior beliefs, likelihood, and utility functions, all behaviour – it is proposed – is consistent with Bayesian rationality. Although such claims are commonplace, their basis is rarely justified. We fill this gap by sketching a proof, and we discuss possible solutions that would make Bayesian approaches empirically interesting.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 4 , August 2011 , pp. 213 - 214
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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