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intuitions, heuristics, and utilitarianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2005

peter singer
peter singer
Affiliation:
university center for human values, princeton university, princeton, nj 08544 and centre for applied philosophy and public ethics, university of melbourne, victoria 3010, [email protected]
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Abstract

a common objection to utilitarianism is that it clashes with our common moral intuitions. understanding the role that heuristics play in moral judgments undermines this objection. it also indicates why we should not use john rawls' model of reflective equilibrium as the basis for testing normative moral theories.

Type
open peer commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 28 , Issue 4 , August 2005 , pp. 560 - 561
Copyright
2005 cambridge university press

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