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The historical and philosophical origins of normativism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Catarina Dutilh Novaes
Catarina Dutilh Novaes
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, 9712 GL Groningen, The Netherlands. [email protected]
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Abstract

Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) critique of normativism is related to an inherently philosophical question: Is thinking a normative affair? Should thinking be held accountable towards certain norms? I present the historical and philosophical origins of the view that thinking belongs to the realm of normativity and has a tight connection with logic, stressing the pivotal role of Kant in these developments.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 2011 , pp. 253 - 254
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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