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Finding a place for experience in the physical-relational structure of the brain

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1999

Gerard O'Brien
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, South Australia 5005, [email protected]@arts.adelaide.edu.au arts.adelaide.edu.au/Philosophy/{gobrien.htm; jopie.htm}
Jonathan Opie
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, South Australia 5005, [email protected]@arts.adelaide.edu.au arts.adelaide.edu.au/Philosophy/{gobrien.htm; jopie.htm}

Abstract

In restricting his analysis to the causal relations of functionalism, on the one hand, and the neurophysiological realizers of biology, on the other, Palmer has overlooked an alternative conception of the relationship between color experience and the brain – one that liberalizes the relation between mental phenomena and their physical implementation, without generating functionalism's counter-intuitive consequences. In this commentary we rely on Palmer's earlier work (especially from 1978) to tease out this alternative.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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