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Explicitness and nonconnectionist vehicle theories of consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2004

Fernando Martínez-Manrique
Fernando Martínez-Manrique*
Affiliation:
Departimento Filosofía, Universidad de Granada, 18011Granada, Spain
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

O'Brien & Opie's connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness is heavily dependent on their notion of explicitness as (1) structural and (2) necessary and sufficient for consciousness. These assumptions unnecessarily constrain their position: the authors are forced to find an intrinsic property of patterns that accounts for the distinction between conscious and unconscious states. Their candidate property, stability, does not capture this distinction. Yet, I show that we can drop assumptions (1) and (2) and still develop a vehicle theory of consciousness. This alternative is better served by models that incorporate both connectionist and symbolic representations.

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 27 , Issue 2 , April 2004 , pp. 302 - 303
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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References

Commentary on Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience. BBS 22(1):127–196.