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Explaining norms and norms explained

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

David Danks  and
Frederick Eberhardt
David Danks
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University and Institute for Human and Machine Cognition, Pittsburgh, PA [email protected]://www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/faculty-danks.php
Frederick Eberhardt
Affiliation:
Institute of Cognitive and Brain Sciences, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720, and Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63130. [email protected]://www.phil.cmu.edu/~fde/
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Abstract

Oaksford & Chater (O&C) aim to provide teleological explanations of behavior by giving an appropriate normative standard: Bayesian inference. We argue that there is no uncontroversial independent justification for the normativity of Bayesian inference, and that O&C fail to satisfy a necessary condition for teleological explanations: demonstration that the normative prescription played a causal role in the behavior's existence.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , February 2009 , pp. 86 - 87
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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