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Does one size fit all? Hurley on shared circuits

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2008

Alvin I. Goldman
Alvin I. Goldman
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-2992. [email protected]://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/goldman
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Abstract

Hurley's high level of generality suggests that a control-theoretic framework underpins all of the phenomena in question, but this is problematic. In contrast to the action-perception domain, where the control-theoretic framework certainly applies, there is no evidence that this framework equally applies to feelings and emotions, such as pain, touch, and disgust, where mirroring and simulational mindreading are also found.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , February 2008 , pp. 27 - 28
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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