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Do we see more than we can access?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Alex Byrne
Affiliation:
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02319
David R. Hilbert
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Chicago, MC 267, Chicago, IL 60607
Susanna Siegel
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, Emerson Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138. [email protected]://web.mit.edu/abyrne/[email protected]/[email protected]://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel

Abstract

One of Block's conclusions, motivated by partial-report superiority experiments, is that there is phenomenally conscious information that is not cognitively accessible. We argue that this conclusion is not supported by the data.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

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