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Difficulties in interpretation associated with substitution failure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Eric Zarahn
Affiliation:
Department of Neurology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104 [email protected] cortex.med.upenn.edu/~zarahn/

Abstract

In one of their arguments against the radical neuron doctrine, Gold & Stoljar (G&S) use the idea that, in certain situations, equivalent terms may not be substitutable into statements that regard properties of the objects to which the terms refer. This device allows G&S to refute the necessity of the conclusion that “the science of the mind equals the science of the brain” even though they take as a premise that the mind equals the brain. I argue, however, that this practice leaves the meaning of the “science of the mind” and the “science of the brain” indeterminate.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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