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A critique of team and Stackelberg reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2003

Herbert Gintis
Herbert Gintis*
Affiliation:
Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Northampton, MA01060; External Faculty, Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NMhttp://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis
*
[email protected]
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Abstract:

Colman's critique of classical game theory is correct, but it is well known. Colman's proposed mechanisms are not plausible. Insufficient reason does what “team reasoning” is supposed to handle, and it applies to a broader set of coordination games. There is little evidence ruling out more traditional alternatives to Stackelberg reasoning, and the latter is implausible when applied to coordination games in general.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , April 2003 , pp. 160 - 161
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003

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