Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-24T20:54:40.253Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Consciousness and mental representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Daniel Gilman
Daniel Gilman
Affiliation:
Department of Humanities, College of Medicine, Penn State University, Hershey, PA 17033 [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Block (1995t) has argued for a noncognitive and non- representational notion of phenomenal consciousness, but his putative examples of this phenomenon are conspicuous in their representational and functional properties while they do not clearly possess other phenomenal properties.

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 150 - 151
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)