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Computation, levels of abstraction, and the intrinsic character of experience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1999

Jürgen Schröder
Jürgen Schröder
Affiliation:
Hanse Institute for Advanced Study, Lehmkuhlenbusch 4, 27753 Delmenhorst, [email protected]
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Abstract

Palmer's color room argument is first contrasted with a different argument by Tim Maudlin against the sufficiency thesis of strong AI. This thesis turns out to be false and hence we need to determine the relevant supervenience base of phenomenal consciousness. That could be done by causal theories and intraindividual experiments. Finally, even if we cannot explain the intrinsic character of conscious states, we may be able to know what the experience of another person is like.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 6 , December 1999 , pp. 970 - 971
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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