Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-7cvxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-18T15:24:57.978Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Churchlands' neuron doctrine: Both cognitive and reductionist

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

John Sutton
John Sutton
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW 2109, [email protected] www.phil.mq.edu.au/staff.htm
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

According to Gold & Stoljar, one cannot consistently be both reductionist about psychoneural relations and invoke concepts developed in the psychological sciences. I deny the utility of their distinction between biological and cognitive neuroscience, suggesting that they construe biological neuroscience too rigidly and cognitive neuroscience too liberally. Then, I reject their characterization of reductionism. Reductions need not go down past neurobiology straight to physics, and cases of partial, local reduction are not neatly distinguishable from cases of mere implementation. Modifying the argument from unification as reduction, I defend a position weaker than the radical but stronger than the trivial neuron doctrine.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 5 , October 1999 , pp. 850 - 851
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)