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Broken telephone in the brain: The need for metacognitive measures

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Hakwan Lau  and
Navindra Persaud
Hakwan Lau
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, OX1 3UD Oxford, United Kingdom. [email protected]://[email protected]://navpersaud.googlepages.com
Navindra Persaud
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, OX1 3UD Oxford, United Kingdom. [email protected]://[email protected]://navpersaud.googlepages.com
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Abstract

The fact that early visual processing has a larger capacity than later visual processing can be explained without positing distinct systems for phenomenology and cognitive accessibility. While phenomenology may overflow forced-choice reports, the later can also overestimate the former, as in the case of blindsight. Metacognitive measures of awareness offer a way to address the “methodological puzzle” of consciousness research.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 513 - 514
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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