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Behavioral game theory: Plausible formal models that predict accurately

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2003

Colin F. Camerer
Colin F. Camerer*
Affiliation:
Division of Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA91125http://hss.caltech.edu/~camerer
*
[email protected]
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Abstract:

Many weaknesses of game theory are cured by new models that embody simple cognitive principles, while maintaining the formalism and generality that makes game theory useful. Social preference models can generate team reasoning by combining reciprocation and correlated equilibrium. Models of limited iterated thinking explain data better than equilibrium models do; and they self-repair problems of implausibility and multiplicity of equilibria.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , April 2003 , pp. 157 - 158
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003

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