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Bayes plus environment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Craig R. M. McKenzie
Craig R. M. McKenzie
Affiliation:
Rady School of Management and Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0553. [email protected]://psy.ucsd.edu/~mckenzie/
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Abstract

Oaksford & Chater's (O&C's) account of deductive reasoning is parsimonious at a local level (because a rational model is used to explain a wide range of behavior) and at a global level (because their Bayesian approach connects to other areas of research). Their emphasis on environmental structure is especially important, and the power of their approach is seen at both the computational and algorithmic levels.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , February 2009 , pp. 93 - 94
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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