Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-g7gxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-08T08:38:57.580Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Banishing “I” and “we” from accounts of metacognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Bryce Huebner  and
Daniel C. Dennett
Bryce Huebner
Affiliation:
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA [email protected]://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~huebner Cognitive Evolution Laboratory, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138. [email protected]://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/incbios/dennettd/dennettd.htm
Daniel C. Dennett
Affiliation:
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA [email protected]://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~huebner
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Carruthers offers a promising model for how “we” know the propositional contents of “our” own minds. Unfortunately, in retaining talk of first-person access to mental states, his suggestions assume that a higher-order self is already “in the loop.” We invite Carruthers to eliminate the first-person from his model and to develop a more thoroughly third-person model of metacognition.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 148 - 149
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bloom, P. (2005) Descartes' baby. Basic Books.Google Scholar
Carruthers, P. (2009) An architecture for dual reasoning. In: In two minds: Dual processes and beyond, ed. Evans, J. St. B. T. & Frankish, K., pp. 109–27. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Dennett, D. C. (1978) Mechanism and responsibility. In: Brainstorms. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Haslam, N. (2006) Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social Psychology 10(3):252–64.Google ScholarPubMed
Jackendoff, R. (1996) How language helps us think. Pragmatics and Cognition 4(1):1–34.Google Scholar
Metzinger, T. (2004) Being no one. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Robbins, P. & Jack, A. (2006) The phenomenal stance. Philosophical Studies 127:59–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar