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Arguing about consciousness: A blind alley and a red herring

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1999

Natika Newton
Natika Newton
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Suffolk County College, Selden, NY 11784 [email protected]
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Abstract

O'Brien & Opie hold that phenomenal experience should be identified with “stable patterns of activation” across the brain's neural networks, and that this proposal has the potential for closing the ‘explanatory gap' between mental states and brain processes. I argue that they have too much respect for the conceivability argument and that their proposal already does much to close the explanatory gap, but that a “perspicuous nexus” can in principle never be achieved.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 1 , February 1999 , pp. 162 - 163
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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