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Are mental states assessed relative to what most people “should” or “would” think? Prescriptive and descriptive components of expected attitudes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Tamar A. Kreps  and
Benoît Monin
Tamar A. Kreps
Affiliation:
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. [email protected]@stanford.eduhttp://www.stanford.edu/people/monin
Benoît Monin
Affiliation:
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. [email protected]@stanford.eduhttp://www.stanford.edu/people/monin
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Abstract

For Knobe, observers evaluate mental states by comparing agents' statements with “defaults,” the attitudes they are expected to hold. In our analysis, Knobe's model relies primarily on what agents should think, and little on expectancies of what they would think. We show the importance and complexity of including descriptive and prescriptive norms if one is to take expectancies seriously.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 341 - 343
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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