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Alternatives and defaults: Knobe's two explanations of how moral judgments influence intuitions about intentionality and causation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department and Kenan Institute for Ethics, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708. [email protected]://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/people/faculty/walter-sinnott-armstrong/
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Abstract

Knobe cites both relevant alternatives and defaults on a continuum to explain how moral judgments influence intuitions about certain apparently non-moral notions. I ask (1) how these two accounts are related, (2) whether they exclude or supplement supposedly competing theories, and (3) how to get positive evidence that people consider relevant alternatives when applying such notions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 349 - 350
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008) A contrastivist manifesto. Social Epistemology 22(3):257–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar