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Why don't concepts constitute a natural kind?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

Richard Samuels  and
Michael Ferreira
Richard Samuels
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210-1365. [email protected]@.osu.edu
Michael Ferreira
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210-1365. [email protected]@.osu.edu
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Abstract

Machery argues that concepts do not constitute a natural kind. We argue that this is a mistake. When appropriately construed, his discussion in fact bolsters the claim that concepts are a natural kind.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 2-3 , June 2010 , pp. 222 - 223
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

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