Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T16:35:33.405Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Unity amidst heterogeneity in theories of concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

Kevan Edwards
Kevan Edwards
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13210. [email protected]://philosophy.syr.edu/FacEdwards.htm
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This commentary raises two concerns with Machery's approach in Doing without Concepts. The first concern is that it may be possible to preserve a unified theory of concepts by distinguishing facts about concept individuation from facts about cognitive structures and processes. The second concern questions the sharpness of the distinction Machery draws between psychological and philosophical conceptions of concepts.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 2-3 , June 2010 , pp. 210 - 211
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Dretske, F. (1981) Knowledge and the flow of information. Blackwell/MIT Press.Google Scholar
Edwards, K. (2009) What concepts do. Synthese 170:289–310.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Edwards, K. (2010) Concept referentialism and the role of empty concepts. Mind and Language 25(1):89–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Field, H. (2001) Truth and the absence of fact. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. A. (1974) Special sciences (Or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis). Synthese 28(2):97–115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. A. (1987) Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. A. (1992) A theory of content and other essays. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. A. (1997) Special sciences: Still autonomous after all these years. Philosophical Perspectives: Mind Causation, and World 2:49–63. (Noûs 31, Suppl.)Google Scholar
Horwich, P. (1998a) Meaning. Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horwich, P. (1998b) Truth, 2nd edition. Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, J. (1992) Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52(1):1–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, J. (1998) Mind in a physical world: An essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Machery, E. (2009) Doing without concepts. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Millikan, R. G. (1984) Language, thought, and other biological categories: New foundations for realism. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Millikan, R. G. (1993) White Queen psychology and other essays for Alice. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Rey, G. (2009b) Review of E. Machery, Doing without Concepts. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. (Online journal. Epub: 2009.07.15.) Available at http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=16608 Google Scholar