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Superblindsight, Inverse Anton, and tweaking A-consciousness further

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2004

Oliver Kauffmann
Oliver Kauffmann*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, DK-2300 S., Denmark
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

It is argued that Block's thought experiment on superblindsight and “the Inverse Anton's syndrome” are not cases of A-consciousness without P-consciousness. “Weak dispositional states” should be excluded from the set of A-conscious states, and a subject's being reflectively conscious of a P-conscious state is suggested as a better candidate for A-consciousness. It is further pointed out that dreams, according to Block's own criterion but contrary to what he claims, are A-unconscious and it is argued that Block should not accept the idea that high-information representational content is an empirically sufficient condition of phenomenality in human beings.

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 27 , Issue 2 , April 2004 , pp. 290 - 294
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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