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Sub-optimal reasons for rejecting optimality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 April 2001

David R. Shanks  and
David Lagnado
David R. Shanks
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University College London, London WC1E 6BT United Kingdom{d.shanks; d.lagnado}@ucl.ac.uk www.psychol.ucl.ac.uk/david.shanks/Shanks.html
David Lagnado
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University College London, London WC1E 6BT United Kingdom{d.shanks; d.lagnado}@ucl.ac.uk www.psychol.ucl.ac.uk/david.shanks/Shanks.html
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Abstract

Although we welcome Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group's shift of emphasis from “coherence” to “correspondence” criteria, their rejection of optimality in human decision making is premature: In many situations, experts can achieve near-optimal performance. Moreover, this competence does not require implausible computing power. The models Gigerenzer et al. evaluate fail to account for many of the most robust properties of human decision making, including examples of optimality.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 23 , Issue 5 , October 2000 , pp. 761 - 762
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press

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