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Steps toward categorizing motivation: Abilities, limitations, and conditional constraints

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2005

Valerie A. Kuhlmeier*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Queen's University, KingstonONK7L 3N6, Canadahttp://www.valeriekuhlmeier.com
Susan A. J. Birch*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver BC V6T 1Z4, Canadahttp://www.curseofknowledge.com

Abstract

Tomasello et al. have not characterized the motivation underlying shared intentionality, and we hope to encourage research on this topic by offering comparative paradigms and specific empirical questions. Although we agree that nonhuman primates differ greatly from us in terms of shared intentionality, we caution against concluding that they lack all aspects of it before other empirical tools have been exhausted. In addition, identifying the conditions in which humans spontaneously engage in shared intentionality, and the conditions in which we fail, will more fully characterize this ability.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2005

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