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Some specifics about generalization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2001

Joshua B. Tenenbaum  and
Thomas L. Griffiths
Joshua B. Tenenbaum
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford CA 94305-2130 [email protected]@psych.stanford.edu
Thomas L. Griffiths
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford CA 94305-2130 [email protected]@psych.stanford.edu
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Abstract

We address two kinds of criticisms of our Bayesian framework for generalization: those that question the correctness or the coverage of our analysis, and those that question its intrinsic value. Speaking to the first set, we clarify the origins and scope of our size principle for weighting hypotheses or features, focusing on its potential status as a cognitive universal; outline several variants of our framework to address additional phenomena of generalization raised in the commentaries; and discuss the subtleties of our claims about the relationship between similarity and generalization. Speaking to the second set, we identify the unique contributions that a rational statistical approach to generalization offers over traditional models that focus on mental representation and cognitive processes.

Type
Author's Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 24 , Issue 4 , August 2001 , pp. 762 - 778
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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