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Reasoning is for thinking, not just for arguing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2011

Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
Affiliation:
Centre for Thinking and Language, School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Plymouth PL4 8AA, United Kingdom. [email protected]
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Abstract

There is indeed extensive evidence that people perform fairly poorly in reasoning tasks and that they often construct arguments for intuitively cued responses. Mercier & Sperber (M&S) may also be right to claim that reasoning evolved primarily as argumentation. However, if it did, the facility became exapted to the function of supporting uniquely human abilities for reflective thinking and consequential decision making.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , April 2011 , pp. 77 - 78
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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