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Pragmatically pristine, the dialogical cause of self-deception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Colin T. Schmidt
Colin T. Schmidt
Affiliation:
The Sorbonne University, 75231 Paris, France [email protected]
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Abstract

Empirical evidence of self-deception's propositional duality is not sought; philosophically relevant links between propositions proper and mind are explored instead. Speech in unison ably indicates the social grounding of such attitudinal structures. An extra-theoretical eye – with regard to cognitivism – is cast on a case of “illusory communication.” The reinforcing of lexical analysis shows Mele's approach to be in need of non-ego concepts, wherefore it lacks soundness with respect to reference.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 126
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

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