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invisible fences of the moral domain

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2005

jonathan haidt
jonathan haidt
Affiliation:
department of psychology, university of virginia, charlottesville, va 22904 [email protected] http://www.people.virginia.edu/~jdh6n/
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Abstract

crossing the border into the moral domain changes moral thinking in two ways: (1) the facts at hand become “anthropocentric” facts not easily open to revision, and (2) moral reasoning is often the servant of moral intuitions, making it difficult for people to challenge their own intuitions. sunstein's argument is sound, but policy makers are likely to resist.

Type
open peer commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 28 , Issue 4 , August 2005 , pp. 552 - 553
Copyright
2005 cambridge university press

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