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How is the moral stance related to the intentional stance and group thinking?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 April 2020
Abstract
The natural history of our moral stance told here in this commentary reveals the close nexus of morality and basic social-cognitive capacities. Big mysteries about morality thus transform into smaller and more manageable ones. Here, I raise questions regarding the conceptual, ontogenetic, and evolutionary relations of the moral stance to the intentional and group stances and to shared intentionality.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
Schmidt, M. F. H., Rakoczy, H. & Tomasello, M. (2012) Young children enforce social norms selectively depending on the violator's group affiliation. Cognition 124(3):325–33.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Sellars, W. (1962) Philosophy and the scientific image of man. In: Frontiers of science and philosophy, ed. Colodny, R., pp. 35–78. University of Pittsburgh Press.Google Scholar
Turiel, E. (1983) The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
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The moral psychology of obligation
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