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Historical myths are believed because audiences are socially motivated

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2025

Shuai Shao Open the ORCID record for Shuai Shao [Opens in a new window]  and
Michael Barlev
Shuai Shao*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, CA, USA [email protected] https://www.shuaishao.org/
Michael Barlev
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA [email protected]://sites.google.com/view/michaelbarlev
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Do people believe in historical myths because they are manipulated by coalitional recruiters, or because it is in their interests to do so? The target article gives somewhat conflicting explanations. We propose that the audiences of historical myths are socially rather than epistemically motivated – they believe and propagate historical myths as a way of signaling their coalitional commitments.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 47 , 2024 , e191
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

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