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Fixing the default position in Knobe's competence model

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Joseph Ulatowski  and
Justus Johnson
Joseph Ulatowski
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Nevada–Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV [email protected]://web.mac.com/oohlah
Justus Johnson
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071. [email protected]
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Abstract

Although we agree with the spirit of Knobe's competence model, our aim in this commentary is to argue that the default position should be made more precise. Our quibble with Knobe's model is that we find it hard to ascribe a coherent view to some experimental subjects if the default position is not clearly defined.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 352 - 353
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

Knobe, J. (2003a) Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language. Analysis 63:190–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nichols, S. & Ulatowski, J. (2007) Intuitions and individual differences: The Knobe effect revisited. Mind and Language 22:346–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ulatowski, J. & Johnson, J. (2010) Folk intuitions and Quinn's doctrine of doing and allowing. Unpublished manuscript, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.Google Scholar