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Explanatory burdens and natural law: Invoking a field description of perception-action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 November 2002

Robert E. Shaw
Affiliation:
Center for the Ecological Study of Perception and Action, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269 [email protected]@uconn.edu http://ione.psy.uconn.edu/~cespaweb/people/wagman.html
Jeffrey B. Wagman
Affiliation:
Center for the Ecological Study of Perception and Action, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269 [email protected]@uconn.edu http://ione.psy.uconn.edu/~cespaweb/people/wagman.html

Abstract

Although we agree with Hommel et al. that perception and action refer to one another, we disagree that they do so via a code. Gibson (1966; 1979) attempted to frame perception-action as a field phenomenon rather than as a particle phenomenon. From such a perspective, perception and action are adjoint, mutually interacting through an information field, and codes are unnecessary.

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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